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Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: 
Institutional Design in the Public Sector 
By MORRIS P. FIORl!'IA and RoGER G. NOLL* 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a 
theory of representative democracy which 
explains why rational actors construct an 
excessively bureaucratized government. 
We define excessive bureaucratization as 
the selection of an inefficient production 
technology for the public sector, 
characterized by relative factor proportions 
that entail more bureaucracy than the pro­
portions that would minimize total costs. 
Thus, the question of excessive bu­
reaucracy is related to but conceptually dif­
ferent from whether a particular policy is 
worthwhile. Furthermore, it presumes a 
concern ... more fundamental than the 
observation that implementing a public 
policy inevitably requires the expenditure 
of scarce resources. 
Section I d escribes a theory formally 
presented in the authors' forthcoming 
article. Section II develops the predictions 
of the theory, most of which have not been . 
tested. Section III outlines reforms that 
might und o some of the effects that the 
theory predicts. 
I. The Theory: A Voter's Dilemma 
We assume that in choosing among al­
ternative political actions, voters, bu­
reaucrats, and politicians pursue their self­
interests. For voters, this means casting 
votes in a manner that maximizes expee.ted 
utility, given the platforms of compe't�ng 
candidates. For bureaucrats, this means 
maximizing some measure of the size of the 
bureaucracy. For politicians, this means 
maximizing the probability of electioq. 
Politicians can affect the welfare of indi­
vidual voters in three ways. First, some of 
the arguments of utility functions are 
government activities. Second, government 
redistributes income through taxation, sub-
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sidization, and expenditures on the produc­
tion of public goods. Third, government bu­
reaucracies, in carrying out public policies, 
impose costs on citizens by ensnarling them 
in red tape. 
We assume that government activities 
can be characterized by a production func­
tion, the arguments of which can be use­
fully classified into bureaucratic and nonbu­
reaucratic inputs. Bureaucratic activities 
include keeping formal records, developing 
and enfordng procedures to govern rela­
tions between the bureau and its clients, 
communicating among parts' of the organi­
zation, and controlling and evaluating 
personnel. These activities impose an 
external cost on citizens because their com­
plexity creates an informational problem 
.. for citizens who seek services, because the 
data required by the bureaucracy come in 
part from the agency's clients who incur 
some expense providing them, and because 
bureaucratic processes are time consum-
ing. 
A legislator serves the home consti­
tuency in various ways (see Fiorina, pp. 
41-49). Legislators collectively d ecide 
general issues of public policy by majority 
rule votes. (We assume that tlJ,e distribution 
of voter preferences supports a majority 
rule equilibrium. While unnecessary, this 
assumption simplifies our argument.) Each 
legislator also is a near-monopolistic sup­
plier of unpriced facilitation services to 
constituents. Facilitation services take 
several forms: intervening in bureaucratic 
processes to aid citizens ensnarled in red 
tape, providing information to citizens who 
want to know how and where to approach 
the bureaucracy, and acquiring for 
constituents a share of "d istributive" 
activities. A government activity is dis­
tributive if it is divisible into subactivities, 
each of which is evaluated and decided 
upon separately and is beneficial to a rela-
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tively small proportion of the electorate. 
Examples are federal construction projects, 
categorical grant programs, and com­
modity-specific tariffs. 
A bureaucracy can assist a legislator in 
carrying out facilitation. It can accom­
modate inquiries by the legislator on behalf 
of constituents by providing information 
about certain services or by expediting a 
decision. It can propose, and try to justify, 
distributive activities in a legislator's home 
district. A rational bureaucrat will use these 
possibilities to serve the objectives of the 
bureau by rewarding legislators who sup-· 
port its programs and appropriations. 
If a bureaucracy responds favorably to 
facilitation activities, it makes legislators 
more attractive to their home consti­
tuencies. Effective facilitation lowers the 
external costs of bureaucracy and raises the 
share of government distributive activities 
to the constituency. The latter is attractive 
because the taxes used to finance a project 
in one district are imposed on everyone, 
whereas the benefits are concentrated. 
Moreover, performance as a facilitator de­
pends on the personal actions of the legisla­
tor, enabling a legislator to claim credit for 
it (see David Mayhew, pp. 52-59). In 
contrast the public policy decisions of the 
legislature are unlikely to be affected by the 
vote of a single legislator. 
One consequence of the preceding argu­
ment is that legislators and bureaucrats 
have an incentive to provide government 
services in an excessively bureaucratized 
manner. To do so raises the demand for 
facilitation services. The electoral process 
does not check this tendency because 
voters face a prisoner's dilemma in choos­
ing among candidates. If voters disapprove 
of excessive bureaucratization, electing a 
legislator who attacks bureaucratic ineffi­
ciency will be unlikely to alter the outcome 
of a majority-rule legislature, but will 
produce a less effective facilitator. 
As the public bureaucracy grows larger, 
the importance of the performance of facili­
tation will grow, and a legislator who is a 
good facilitator will be increasingly likely to 
be reelected. A challenger who is unproven 
as a facilitator is a riskier choice than an ef-
fective incumbent, and consequently 
provides a lower expected payoff in this 
role. This tendency will be accentuated if a 
legislator becomes a more effective facilita­
tor over time. Because part of facilitation is 
the possession and use of information 
which is acquired through experience, and 
because seniority enhances the influence of 
a legislator in determining the fate of an 
agency, incumbents can be more effective 
facilitators than their challengers. 
II. Applications: Evidence and Predictions 
Di re ct observation of the production 
function for a government activity is espe­
cially difficult, and a test of the primary im­
plication of the theory-that public 
activities are excessively bureaucratized­
is beyond us at present. We offer some in­
direct evidence, and pres�11tother predic­
tions of the theory. 
A. Facilitation and 
Congressional £/ecrions 
During the early postwar period 
congressional elections were low in­
formation affairs in which most citizens 
voted according to traditional partisan 
affiliations that reflected a generalized 
preference for one party (see Donald 
Stokes and Warren Miller). Since the early 
l 960's, the impact of partisan affiliations on 
congressional votes has been declining. 
The most important influence to take up the 
slack is incumbency. The '"incumbency ad­
vantage'' now appears to be 5 to I 0 percent
in House elections (see Robert Erikson; 
John Ferejohn) and a few points higher in 
the Senate (see Warren Kostroski). The in­
cumbency advantage is not a result of post­
Wesberry redistrictings favorable to incum­
bents, nor to increased knowledge of in­
cumbents-despite their greatly increased 
advertising before a more educated, less 
partisan electorate (see Fiorina, ch. 3). 
Elsewhere (see the authors, 1977) we 
show that rational incumbents should base 
reelection efforts on facilitative activities 
rather than programmatic advocacy. This 
conclusion follows from the relatively un-
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controversial nature of the former and the 
greater personal effectiveness of the legisla­
tor in facilitative activities. 
Effective facilitation requires resources, 
and in the past two decades these resources 
have increased dramatically. Congressional 
employment is one example. Several sup­
port organizations have been established 
(Legislative Reference Service, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Congressional 
Budget Office). Committee staffs have 
expanded, and the personal staffs of 
congressmen have grown from six to a 
baker's dozen (see Table l). The ostensible 
reason for these developments is the grow­
ing com p l e x i t y  o f  g ove r n a n c e. 
Congressmen also argue that this growth 
offsets an imbalance of expertise between 
the executive and legislative branches. 
Perhaps, but another reason may be growth 
in facilitation activities. 
Few solid data exist, but congressmen 
have greatly expanded their district staff 
presence (see Table I), and presumably the 
staff in Peoria has less to do with legislation 
than with facilitation. Moreover, rough 
estimates indicate that even the Wash­
ington staff spends more than half its time 
on facilitation (see Fiorina, p. 59). Other 
innovations that serve the facilitation role 
are mobile district offices, allowances for 
computerized records about constituents, 
and more paid trips home (representatives 
had three in 1960 and thirty-two in 1978). 
B. Policy Trends 
TABLE I-THE PERSONAL STAFFS 
OF CONGRESSMEN 
1960 1967 1974 
·�---- ·-·-�--
Total staff 2,344 3,276 5, 109 
Percent assigned to district 14 26 34 
Percent district offices open 
only when congressman is 
home or after adjournment 29 II 2 
Percent congressmen with 
multiple district offices 4 18 47 
Source: Annual Congressional Staff Directories, 
compiled by Charles B. Brownson. 
Great Society programs through Congress 
was his willingness to use distributive 
politics to purchase congressional support. 
In I 964, over one-third of all federal grant 
programs allocated funds by formula. Dur­
ing 1965 and 1966, the number of grant pro­
grams increased by 70 p.ercent, 'and only 
about one-sixth of the new pr,ograms used 
allocation formulas (see Advisory Com­
m1ss10n on Intergovernmental Relations, 
p. 151).
Congress can encourage facilitation in 
ways other than distributive policy making. 
For example, regulatory legislation can be 
so vague that an agency must make nu­
merous detailed decisions before imple­
menting it (see Theodore-Lowi). Later, 
oversight subcommittees find it easier to 
use budgetary review as a lever for affect­
ing regulations than to change a law. 
A second implication concerns the 
increasing acceptance of new programs 
after they are enacted. While legislative 
Three general implications about the proposals may be controversial, opposition 
construction and implementation of public will decline once the program is es-
policy follow from the theoretical dis- , tablished. Before enactment no facilitation 
cussion in the first section. takes place. If constituents care about a 
First, because legislators profit from ef- p r o p o s e d  p r o g r a m ,  they ev a l u ate 
fective facilitation and bureaucrats profit politicians according to their positions on 
from accommodating legislators, both have the issue. Once the program is established, 
an incentive to structure programs so that both supporters and opponents need facili-
facilitation is important. A principal way to tation. A legislator's policy position be-
do this is to inject distributive elements into comes less important than facilitative 
a program. Expenditure programs, for abilities. Die-hard legislators who oppose 
example, can employ project-by-project de- an agency unsuccessfully only succeed in 
cisions or automatic distribution according penalizing their districts, perhaps by overt 
to a fixed formula. One explanation for agency actions, but more likely by forego-
Lyndon Jo�nson's wizardry in steering ing what would be their "due" under the 
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program (see Barry Weingast). Republicans 
who vote en bloc against new social pro­
grams quietly go along with reauthorization 
(see David Stockman). We suspect that 
new programs gradually become altered in 
the direction of distributive politics, which 
would provide a further reason why pro­
grams that initially trigger major political 
battles gradually become the object of a 
political consensus. 
A third policy implication is the loosen­
ing of policy ties between representatives 
and their constituencies. Because facilita­
tion gives incumbents an electoral ad­
vantage, their policy positions are less im­
portant in their constituents' evaluation of 
them. For any given incumbent advantage 
arising from facilitation, an incumbent may 
deviate from the position of the median 
voter by some amount and still expect to 
defeat a challenger who adopts the median 
voter's ideal position (see the authors, 
forthcoming). 
The model does not imply that the 
amount of public goods provided by the 
government is greater than would be the 
case in the absence of facilitating activities. 
Because the public sector adopts inefficient 
production technologies, the amount of 
public goods that the median voter desires 
will be less than if production were at 
minimum cost; however, the incumbency 
advantage may offset this effect if the in­
cumbent's policy position moves in the di­
rection of more public goods than the 
median voter prefers. The incumbent has a 
generalized incentive to move in this direc­
tion because a larger public sector implies a 
greater demand for facilitation and a cor­
respondingly greater incumbency ad­
vantage. Additionally, to move outside the 
model for a moment, as the policy ties 
between incumbents and their districts 
weaken, the former are increasingly at 
liberty to cooperate with special interests 
that desire some particular government 
activity or expenditure. 
To summarize, we attribute the increase 
in the incumbency advantage in congres­
sional elections to the gradual transforma­
tion of congressmen from makers of na­
tional policy to ombudsmen and grantsmen. 
The scope of the federal government has 
expanded during the past two decades, 
creating greater opportunities for citizens 
to profit from bureaucratically administered 
programs, and numerous occasions for 
citizens to run afoul of bureaucratically 
promulgated regulations. An incumbent's 
experience and seniority are an important 
resource which disappears upon election of 
a challenger. In this brave new world, 
citizens have come to attach more im­
portance to the facilitation activities of 
congressmen (see Roger Davidson). 
III. Prospects For Change 
The foregoing theory of the legislative 
process does not work in quite the way that 
constitutional theory postulates. Our 
theory simply isolates the incentives facing 
modern voters, bureaucrats and legislators, 
incentives created by the institutions within 
which legislators and bureaucrats act. To 
change the system requires changing the 
institutions. Several possibilities are 
imaginable; none appear likely. From most 
to least drastic they include: 
I .  Remove incumbents' facilitative 
powers. This involves slashing staffs and 
removing the constitutional basis for 
congressional power over the bureaucracy, 
making the latter more responsible to the 
president, who has a national constituency. 
Of course, this possibility is fraught with 
the dangers of the imperial presidency. 
2. Change the electoral system for 
congressmen. If legislators increasingly are 
elected for facilitative efforts, legislators 
are less responsive for their policy posi­
tions and no one is responsible for legisla­
tive policy. Altering this situation probably 
requires abandoning the single member dis­
trict. Proportional representation makes a 
candidate's election depend on the 
percentage of the vote received by parties 
nationally rather than each candidate's per­
sonal percentage in one district. This makes 
legislators more dependent on the policy 
position of the parties, but eliminates 
representation of particular constituencies. 
3. Lessen incumbents' facilitation 
responsibilitil:'s. In other countries the 
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ombudsman role is performed by a special 
office, rather than by individual legislators. 
As rational actors American congressmen 
steadfastly resist suggestions to establish a 
federal ombudsman. Even mild proposals 
such as Henry Reuss's Administrative 
Counsel of the Congress receive quick 
execution. British MPs, whose facilitation 
powers and resources do not compare to 
the American congressman's, approved 
the creation of the Parliamentary Com­
missioner for Administration (ombudsman) 
only after they were made the communica­
tion link between constituents and the new 
office. 
4. Cumulative policy failure. A long­
run prospect for change is inherent in ever 
less efficient policies that impose ever 
heavier external costs on citizens. If the 
situation deteriorates sufficiently, the 
voter's prisoner's dilemma might be 
broken: the attempt to elect antibureau­
cratic legislators could become rational 
even if failure to elect a majority resulted in 
losses to the districts which elect them. 
Despite the preceding emphasis on pros­
pects for changing the legislative system, 
we hasten to emphasize that this system 
has positive aspects. Bureaucracy is 
permanent, and information about it is 
valuable. Some argue that facilitation is the 
only role modern legislators can perform 
well (see Samuel Huntington). To reach 
judgments of the costs and benefits of legis­
lative facilitation, we must recognize that 
facilitation exists and include it in our 
analysis. 
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